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ABSTRACT
We present an individual-centric model for COVID-19 spread in an urban setting.
We first analyze patient and route data of infected patients from January 20, 2020,
to May 31, 2020, collected by the Korean Center for Disease Control & Prevention
(KCDC) and illustrate how infection clusters develop as a function of time. This
analysis o↵ers a statistical characterization of mobility habits and patterns of indi-
viduals. We use this characterization to parameterize agent-based simulations that
capture the spread of the disease, we evaluate simulation predictions with ground
truth, and we evaluate di↵erent what-if counter-measure scenarios. Although the
presented agent-based model is not a definitive model of how COVID-19 spreads in
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On March 11, 2020, the WHO declared COVID-19 the first pandemic caused by a coro-
navirus [6]. Since then, prediction of the spread of the disease became a critical guide of
public health policy. A tremendous amount of data is collected to help policy decisions
that can limit the spread of COVID-19. For example, Google provides time-series data of
infections at a coarse granularity1 (i.e., as a function of the area’s population, no infor-
mation is provided at the granularity of single individuals). Epidemiological simulation
and mathematical models have been used to predict the spread of the disease. Typically,
model e↵ectiveness is tied to its input parameterization.
In this thesis, we use data provided by the Korean Center for Disease Control (KCDC)
and local governments during the first wave of the disease in South Korea. In contrast to
the Google data, the KCDC data focus on individual patients and allow the development of
an individual-centric model of the COVID-19 epidemic. Infected individuals are monitored
and their movements are logged using CCTV, cellphones, and credit card transactions [17].
The KCDC records patient movements in plain text (i.e., natural language) without any
unified rule. These logs are parsed through automated code and rule-based methods to
extract keywords that are then used with web mapping service APIs (e.g., Google Maps [1],
Kakao Map [2], or Naver Map [3]) to extract geographical coordinates (i.e., latitude and
1https://console.cloud.google.com/marketplace/product/bigquery-public-datasets/
covid19-open-data
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longitude) and other data. The parsed logs are made publicly available [25] and being
collected by KCDC are deemed trustworthy.
To the best of our knowledge, the KCDC logs are the only publicly available data that
contain patient-centric information in great detail: they report on the patient mobility,
i.e., traveled distance and the sequence of locations visited on a daily basis, the date of
the onset of symptoms, whether and when the patient got in contact with other patients
that are also diagnosed. The KCDC data set remains a valuable resource for studying the
spread of COVID-19, yet it presents some limitations:
• South Korea has a small number of COVID-19 cases (i.e., 81,185 on February 7, 2021)
compared to other countries, and the last version of the KCDC data set contains
data collected up to May 31, 2020 (the KCDC data set has not been updated since
then). By May 31, approximately 11,500 COVID-19 cases were confirmed in South
Korea [17, 28], but only 35% of them have been logged into the data set.
• Some locations visited by patients are not recorded due to privacy concerns. Con-
sequently, patient infection information and route data do not always coincide. For
example, there are patients that infect each other even if their routes do not cross.
This may happen when patients belong to the same household (locations where
people live are rarely logged).
• Patient and route data may be incomplete (i.e., some attributes are occasionally
missing, such as the type of locations visited by some patients) and require manual
completion before analyzing the data set.
• There is route data information for only a portion of the patients. Patient movement
has been logged only for the 15% of all confirmed cases by May 31. Because of privacy
concerns, this data set is no longer publicly available.
We adopt di↵erent strategies to address the above challenges. We have manually retrieved
certain missing attributes: in the case of patient routes with missing location type (e.g.,
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store, school, hospital, airport), we use the provided geographical coordinates to retrieve
the visited location and identify its type. Regretfully, some missing data are not possible
to recover.
Specifically, provided that the mobility of only the 15% of confirmed patients are logged
in detail, we can only “guess” the pertinent information of the remaining patients assuming
that their mobility is independent and identically distributed to the 15% of patients with
detailed logs. We content that while detailed logs provide data of statistical significance,
their usage introduces some unavoidable bias towards the percentage of patients who
voluntarily shared more information than others. Yet, statistical information derived
from histograms (i.e., processed data) fill-in the gaps of missing information and can be
used as input of patient activity in the simulation. We point out that our analysis and
processing of this portion of the data was made before the detailed movement logs became
unavailable. Here, we use this processed data in the form of histograms (and also make
them available to the community), see the supplement for information on the simulation
tool and its input data.
We use logs and histograms to feed a patched version of GeoMason [35], a tool that
uses agent-based models (ABM) and geographic information systems (GIS). GeoMason
has been used to study disease outbreaks (e.g., a cholera outbreak is studied using this
tool in [14]). We simulate interactions of thousands of people in the Gangnam and Seocho
districts of Seoul on roads and in buildings to investigate the COVID-19 outbreak in the
largest metropolis of South Korea and evaluate di↵erent what-if mitigation scenarios. We
validate the results of the simulation with the ground truth derived from the KCDC logs.
This tool o↵ers a flexible model based on real-world COVID-19 spread information and
can be used to facilitate evaluation of di↵erent mitigation measures and patient behaviors.
Our contributions and outline of this thesis are:
• We analyze and connect hard data from various KCDC logs to extract information
on detailed patient movements (Chapters 2 and 3). Missing information is manually
retrieved, when possible.
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• We provide statistical analysis of population movements and habits in the form of
histograms.
• We parameterize an agent-based model that uses the KCDC data as input, see
Chapter 4, and its flexibility to capture a variety of conditions is outlined. The simulation
tool and processed data will be open sourced, see the appendix for details.
• The simulation model is validated in Chapter 5 and its usage and limitations are
discussed in Chapter 6.
6
Chapter 2
The KCDC Data Set
Here, the KCDC data sets are described. The data sets [25] used in this thesis contain data
collected by the KCDC and local governments from January 20, 2020, to May 31, 2020.
The PatientInfo and PatientRoute data sets contain information and routes of COVID-19
patients in Seoul, respectively. The amount of data in each data set is shown in Table 2.1.
The number of (healthy and sick) people moving across Seoul districts are also provided
in the SeoulFloating data set. This data has been collected using the Big Data Hub of SK
Telecom, a Korean wireless telecommunications operator.
PatientInfo data set. This data set provides epidemiological data of COVID-19 pa-
tients. It contains 4004 di↵erent entries, each entry represents a di↵erent patient identified
by an ID (patient id). Other attributes include their gender and age, their provenance
(country, province, and city), whether they have been infected in a known case (infec-
tion case, e.g., overseas inflow or contact with patient) and the ID of the patient that
infected them (infected by), the number of people that the patient came in contact with
(contact number), and the date of their first symptoms (symptom onset date). This data
set is also described in [26].
PatientRoute data set. This data set is no longer publicly available. We retrieved
this data set from the Kaggle repository [25] that contained trace data collected up to
May 31, 2020. This data set contains 8092 entries, each one reporting a visit (to one of
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Table 2.1: Number of (unique) entries of PatientInfo and PatientRoute, two of the three
data sets used in this thesis.
PatientInfo PatientRoute
Total entries 4004 8092
Unique patients 4004 1472
Unique locations – 2992
Unknown location type – 2341
2992 unique locations) of 1472 (out of 4004) unique South Korean COVID-19 patients
logged in the PatientInfo data set. A location is unequivocally identified by its latitude
and longitude. Province, city, and type (e.g., airport, hospital, store) of each location are
also provided. The attribute type of almost 30% of entries is set to etc (i.e., locations that
cannot be identified using the rule-based approach of [25]). We manually look for their
type using their geographical coordinates and OpenStreetMap [4] to compensate for this
lack of data. Each entry also contains the patient (identified by patient id, the same as in
the PatientInfo data set, and by global num, another ID used only in this data set) that
visited the location on a specific date. The time spent in the location is not available.
Locations visited by a patient in a single day are logged in chronological order.
SeoulFloating data set. This data set provides hourly data of people moving across
Seoul districts. Data are collected from January 1 to May 31, 2020, by SK Telecom. Col-
lected data are grouped by gender, age, and district and allows visualizing the movement
of people in Seoul during this period. Age is provided at the decade granularity for people
in their 20s through 70s. No information is provided for children or for people who are
80 or older. As a result, it is not possible to conclude on infections at education facilities
or directly model mitigation measures that include school closings. This data set reports
data on the entire Seoul population, not just the COVID-19 patients, and only considers




Although the information contained in the KCDC data sets is not as accurate as one
would like, it still allows for the analysis of patient movements and interactions with high
accuracy. In this chapter, we discuss information that we extract from the data sets and
how it is used to parameterize the GeoMason ABM tool [35].
3.1 Visited Locations
Figs. 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) depict a heat map of the most visited locations in South Korea
and Seoul, respectively, showing where COVID-19 outbreaks are more likely to happen.
Heat maps in Fig. 3.1 also show the South Korean cities for which movement data are
recorded. Visibly, Seoul is the city with the most visited locations. Within Seoul, the
south-west and south-east areas are those with more patient routes. The financial district
and company head-quarters are located in the south-west part of the city. The south-
east region corresponds to the Gangnam district, outlined in blue in Fig. 3.1(b). Many
shopping and entertainment centers are located in Gangnam.
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(a) South Korea. Blue
points indicate hotspots.
(b) Seoul. Gangnam district is outlined in blue.
Figure 3.1: Heat maps of most visited locations.
Figure 3.2: Mobility of Seoul population over time by age group according to cell-phone
data provided by SK telecom.
3.2 Seoul Population
Since Seoul has more logs in PatientRoute as shown in Fig. 3.1a, we analyze its population
habits from January 1, 2020, to May 31, 2020, and extract information to determine how
to put residents in di↵erent classes to model population movements. Fig. 3.2 depicts the
population (grouped by age) of both healthy and sick people moving in Seoul on a per-
day basis. Two clear classes of people are identified depending on their mobility: people
that are 20 – 50 years old (adults) and those that are 60 – 70 (seniors). The first group
has higher mobility within the city during week days, but this mobility decreases during
weekends. The second group (seniors) does not have any discernible change in mobility
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patterns during the week. A dip for the adult class observed on January 25 corresponds
to the lunar new year day, no such dip is observed for the senior class. Perhaps because of
the pandemic onset in South Korea and KCDC advice, we observe the mobility of seniors
to decrease starting at the beginning of February.
3.3 Patient Connections
Figs. 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) present a subgraph of patient connections (to improve visibility, we
only present a small portion of the entire graph). Here, nodes depict patients, black edges
connect patients that visited the same place during the same day, and red edges represent
the virus spreading information obtained from the PatientInfo data set (i.e., infected by
attribute). Some red edges do not overlap with black edges. This means that, even if one
of the two nodes connected by the red edge infected the other, no connections (i.e., visits
to the same location during the same day) have been recorded in the data set. The node
degree in Figs. 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) shows the contact degree among patients and illustrates
visually the complexity of the problem.
(a) Patient connections (partial 1). (b) Patient connections (partial 2).
Figure 3.3: Patient contacts.
Fig. 3.4 shows a summary view of patient connections: the contact degree CDF of all
patients for the entire dataset. Three CDFs are shown: one for the whole South Korea,
one for Seoul, and another one for the Gyeongsangbuk-do province. Interestingly, all
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CDFs have a similar shape. High contact degrees indicate potential super spreaders (i.e.,
patients that infect many other people). People who come into contact with many others
are not necessarily super spreaders since it is unknown whether or not they were sick or
healthy when contact occurred. Because of this, further analysis is required to determine
whether or not a patient is a super spreader.
Figure 3.4: Contact Degree CDF.
3.4 Super Spreaders
Fig. 3.5 illustrates a subset of patients where the infected by relationship (i.e., patient
A is infected by patient B) is known from the PatientInfo data set. The entire graph
contains 1052 patient nodes and 822 edges representing the known infection spread. For
the sake of visibility, we present just a data subset. Red nodes correspond to individuals
with available route information who are known to have infected others, green nodes
correspond to individuals who infected others but have no available route information,
and blue nodes correspond to patients who are not known to have infected others. This
particular subset shows a mix of super spreaders (i.e., people who infected more than six
people) and low spreaders, who infected six or fewer people1. The large “fans” in this
figure are indicative of super spreaders. The di↵erent behaviors of super/low spreaders
are shown in Fig. 3.6. Super spreaders account for 3.59% and low spreaders account for
1We define a “super spreader” as someone who infects at least 6 people. This allows us to divide the
data set to obtain the most noticeable di↵erence in patient behavior (number of locations, number of days,
number of records).
CHAPTER 3. DATA ANALYSIS 12
the remaining 96.41% of patients.
Figure 3.5: Infection spread subgraph: Red nodes indicate patients with route informa-
tion who infected others. Green nodes indicate patients who infected others but do not
have any route information. Blue nodes indicate patients who did not infect anyone else.




Figure 3.6: Super spreader analysis.
Fig. 3.6 presents CDFs of the number of people infected by an individual, the number
of days in the log that the individual appears, the unique visited locations, and the total
number of visited locations. The CDFs in this figure indicate that, in general, super
spreaders tend to be active for more days, visit more unique locations, and have longer
routes than low spreaders. The figure shows that all super spreaders in the data set are
active for three or more days and visit three or more unique locations. Some of these
super spreaders are active for up to 19 days and visit up to 18 unique locations with route
lengths of up to 31 locations.
3.5 Daily Traveled Distance
Fig. 3.7(a) plots the density heat map of distance traveled by patients in Seoul and the
number of locations visited in a day, two important features due to the vital nature of
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(a) Density heat map. (b) Distance CDF.
Figure 3.7: Daily traveled distance and visited locations.
patient movement to spread COVID-19. The darker the area, the more patients have the
same traveled distance and visited locations. With some exceptions, people mostly travel
short distances and visit only a few locations each day. The CDF of the daily traveled
distance is shown in Fig. 3.7(b).
3.6 Patient Mobility
Patient mobility is another important attribute to consider. Intuitively, the more places a
patient visits, the higher their mobility is. Fig. 3.8(a) depicts the number of patients that
are seen on a specific number of unique locations (x-axis) for a specific number of days
(y-axis). Note that this graph does not distinguish patient mobility across di↵erent days.
Indeed, looking at the mobility of individual patients, there are days where they exhibit
high mobility and days where they move significantly less. This points to a more usable
definition of mobility as a function of di↵erent time periods (days). Fig. 3.8(b) shows
the day count of unique locations reached by the patients in the data set: for 2,063 days
(88.9% of days) a typical patient visits 1–3 locations, while for 258 days (11.1%) more
than 3 unique locations are visited.
Defining a high mobility day as a day during which a patient visits at least L locations,
the mobility of a patient is given as the ratio of the patient high mobility days to all logged
days for this specific individual. Note that this is not the only way to define mobility. For
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simulation purposes (see Chapter 4), this definition provides a practical way to capture
mobility with a probability. Based on the histogram shown in Fig. 3.8(b), days with L  3
are considered of low mobility. The CDF of patient mobility using the above definition is
depicted in Fig. 3.9(a). The figure shows that 57.6% of patients never visit more than 4
locations in a day.
Di↵erent classes of patients have di↵erent mobility. Fig. 3.9(b) shows the di↵erence in
mobility between super spreaders and low spreaders, while Fig. 3.9(c) illustrates mobility
by age groups. Super spreaders and young people have higher mobility compared to low
spreaders and seniors, respectively. For higher percentiles, the low spreaders have larger
mobility than super spreaders due to the small number of super spreader agents in the
KCDC data set.
(a) Patient count heatmap. (b) PDF of unique locations
per day.
Figure 3.8: Patient unique locations.
(a) Mobility CDF. (b) Low/super spreaders. (c) Young vs. seniors.
Figure 3.9: Patient mobility.
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(a) Active days after first
symptoms.
(b) Unique locations visited af-
ter first symptoms.
(c) Total locations visited after
first symptoms.
Figure 3.10: Irresponsible behavior of sick patients.
3.7 Irresponsible Behaviors
Patients behave irresponsibly when they keep moving after the onset of their first COVID-
19 symptoms, which facilitates the di↵usion of the disease. We present how long sick people
continue to show mobility after exhibiting symptoms, see Fig. 3.10. The figure shows that
only the 20% of patients stop moving and isolate immediately after initial symptoms are
observed. Some patients keep moving for more than a week after the onset of symptoms,
see Fig. 3.10(a). They also visit many locations; Figs. 3.10(b) and 3.10(c) show the number




In this chapter, we show how to parameterize a simulation based on a patched version
of GeoMason [35] using the characterization presented in Chapter 3. The attributes, life
cycle, and states of an agent are shown in Figure 4.1. The following attributes are set
during the initialization phase:
1. Infection status. One or more random agents are selected as the initial case(s).
2. Position. Agents are randomly placed on a road in the simulated area.
3. Speed. There are two types of agents: 50% of agents are considered pedestrian and
walk at a speed of 3 MPH before reaching their destination; other agents drive a
vehicle and their speed is uniformly distributed between 10 and 25 MPH.1
4. Type of spreaders. We define two classes of spreaders: 3.59% of patients are super
spreaders and 96.41% are low spreaders (see Chapter 3.4).
5. Mobility. We use the mobility of super spreaders and low spreaders depicted in
Fig. 3.9(b) to model di↵erent types of patient mobility.
In addition to the mobility distribution of super spreaders and low spreaders, the CDF of
daily traveled distance in Fig. 3.7(a) is also used to determine the distance to a destination.
1We stress that these are nominal choices: any pedestrian to vehicles ratios can be used as input to the
model.
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Simulation time is defined by cycles. In each simulation cycle, agents outside a building
move along the road towards their destination; agents inside a building can choose to stay
or leave, based on their mobility. Agents with high mobility have a high probability to
leave the building. Note that agents stay in a building for at least 15 minutes in order to
meet the definition of close contact [11]. If multiple agents are inside the same building,
they may infect each other with a certain probability.
When infection happens, the agent state changes from healthy to infected, as the state
transition shown in Fig. 4.1. We assume the outdoor infection probability to be negligible.
Given the probability of infection inside a building, ↵, and the number of infected agents
in the building, n, the probability of a healthy agent to be infected by a contact within
the building is:
Pr(infection) = 1  (1  ↵)n. (4.1)
Note that the probability of infection defined by Eq. 4.1 is nominal. Any model can be used
here to capture the viral load: the total number of people in the location, the duration of
interaction among individuals, the square footage of the room, its air circulation, wearing
a mask or not, see [29] for examples on how to adjust Eq. (4.1).
It takes 1–14 days for patients to show symptoms after infection according to the
WHO [38]. We therefore use a Uniform distribution between 1 and 14 days to transition
from infected to symptomatic. A uniform distribution is again nominal here, one could
easily use any distribution, e.g., a lognormal distribition with its peak set to 5 to capture
a more realistic scenario consistent with hard data.
Since there exist patients who continue to move even after showing symptoms, as seen
in Fig. 3.10, we use the CDF in Fig. 3.10(a) to determine the number of active days after
their first symptoms. We do not distinguish the behavior of super and low spreaders be-
cause of lack of data (there are only two super spreaders with symptom onset information
available). After each infected person exhausts their active days after infection, they are
isolated.
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Figure 4.1: Life cycle of an agent. Figure 4.2: Simulation
screenshot.
Consistent with infectious disease simulation studies [27], we set the simulation cycle
to 5 minutes. The simulation stops either when all agents are infected or after a number
of cycles defined by the user.2
We simulate the COVID-19 outbreak in the Gangnam district, i.e., the municipality
of Seoul with the most hotspots, see Fig. 3.1(b). This area has 11,438 road intersections
and 7,043 buildings. Roads and buildings are placed in the simulated area as described
in [5], a collection of GIS data with regard to Seoul. GeoMason loads the GIS data (e.g.,
roads, road intersections, buildings) stored in a shapefile format, i.e., a file that stores
geometric locations and their attribute information. Although the longest distance we
observe in PatientRoute data set in Seoul is 30 miles, the longest distance between two
buildings in the simulated Gangnam district is 7.06 miles. Therefore, we normalize the
maximum distance to 3.53, which is half of the longest distance in the simulated area, to
ensure a valid building selection as the agent’s destination. In the Gangnam district there
are 604,586 people and a total of 7,043 buildings. We do not have any information on the
building stories, entries, or number of rooms. This information is crucial, especially for
apartment buildings, where multiple people can be inside the same building at the same
2In this simulation, we do not explicitly model agent recovery: a recovered agent that resumes its
mobility is considered immune and non-contagious, therefore does not contribute to the disease spread.
The simulation can be trivially extended to model recovered agents re-entering the simulation cycle.
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(a) Population = 10,000. (b) Population = 20,000.
Figure 4.3: Simulating patient isolation.
(a) Population = 10,000. (b) Population = 20,000.
Figure 4.4: Percentage of active agents while infected.
time without contact. To address this lack of information, we limit the population in our
simulations. We validate parameter choices against ground truth data in Chapter 5.
A screenshot of the GeoMason simulation execution can be seen in Fig. 4.2. Black lines
are roads that agents travel on and green areas are buildings where agents stop. Agents
only have two states in terms of infection, i.e., infected (red dots) or healthy (blue dots).
Fig. 4.3 depicts the percentage of infected population as a function of time. The
simulation begins with one infected agent and stops after 50 days. The graph illustrates
how quickly the entire population is infected for four infection rates that correspond to
measures such as mask wearing and social distancing. The figure includes results for two
population sizes and shows the speed of the disease spread as a function of population
density, infection in Fig. 4.3(b) is faster than Fig. 4.3(a). For simulation scalability reasons,
we limit the entire population to a manageable number. We illustrate in Chapter 5 that
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a smaller population can still capture observed trends with appropriate parameterization.
As a companion to Fig. 4.3, we also present the portions of “active while infected”
and isolated agents, see Fig. 4.4. In Fig. 4.4, the benefit of patient isolation can be seen
clearly: the percentage of active infected population is decreasing after showing a peak,
which limits the speed of the spread of the disease. The percentage of isolated population
shown in Fig. 4.5 explains the decrease of active infected population. After more agents
show symptoms and are isolated, the active infected population starts dropping.
(a) Population = 10,000. (b) Population = 20,000.
Figure 4.5: Percentage of isolated population.
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Chapter 5
Model Validation and Case Study
After presenting the generic results in Chapter 4, we showcase the flexibility of this sim-
ulation model. We first validate the simulation using the ground truth, then we simulate
di↵erent mitigation measures to assess their e↵ectiveness.
5.1 Validation
In this simulation, we include the Seocho district, a neighboring district of Gangnam, to
study the e↵ect of moving agents across di↵erent districts. Fig. 5.1 shows the percentage
of residents in these two districts that have been infected, the figure also illustrates the
frequency of residents visiting buildings in their home district, as well as visiting the other
district. We use this information to parameterize the simulation. During the initialization
phase, we separate the agents into Gangnam residents (70.4% of the population) and
Seocho residents (29.6% of the population). Next, we retrieve the distributions of agent
Figure 5.1: Movements of Gangnam and Seocho residents.
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Figure 5.2: Infected population in the validation simulation. The overlap of two sim-
ulation cases with the ground truth retrieved from the data set validates the simulation
settings. Results are presented with 95% confidence intervals (error margins are give by
the colored ranges).
mobility and spreader types from the data set for residents of each district to set their
attributes. After initialization, when selecting destination buildings, the probability of a
resident staying or leaving their home district follows Fig. 5.1.
Since two districts are considered in this simulation, starting with only one infected
agent in one of the two areas could bias the results. Here, we start the simulation with
55 infected agents, i.e., the number of infections observed from the data set on March 9,
2020, proportionally assigned to agents in the two districts (29.6% in Seocho, 70.4% in
Gangnam). We selected March 9, 2020 because mitigation e↵orts in Seoul have yet to
produce a noticeable e↵ect on disease spread, while also allowing us to clearly see trends.
Simulations starting at any time earlier or around March 9, result in similar infection
trends.
Fig. 5.2 depicts the number of COVID-19 cases in the Gangnam and Seocho districts
observed from the data set (black line) and simulation (red and blue lines). The ground
truth line illustrates the COVID-19 outbreak in the two districts. At the beginning of
April, the curve flattens. This is likely due to e↵ective counter-measures executed in Seoul,
especially the Strong Social Distancing Campaign which began on March 22. Consistent
with the COVID-19 incubation timeline, the e↵ectiveness of the Strong Social Distancing
Campaign does not show immediately, but after the beginning of April. We align the
beginning of simulation data to the time of 55 infection cases in the ground truth, since
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(a) Ground truth (b) Simulation: 10K (c) Simulation: 20K
Figure 5.3: Hotspots in the data set (ground truth) and model.
this is the starting point of the simulation. The two simulation lines in Fig. 5.2 closely
follow the ground truth: the simulation of population 10,000 with infection rate 0.004 and
the simulation of population 20,000 with infection rate 0.002 are in excellent agreement
with the ground truth from March 26, 2020 to April 5, 2020, when the e↵ects of any
counter-measures are not discernible yet. The overlap of two simulation cases with the
ground truth validates the simulation.
We note in Fig. 5.2 an interesting relationship between population and infection rate:
when the population is doubled, dividing the infection rate in half gives similar simulation
outcomes. This observation also meets the results in the generic simulation that higher
population leads to faster spreading of the COVID-19 virus, while lowering the infection
rate slows down the virus spreading. We conclude that we can use a “limited” population
with an adjusted infection rate to e ciently (yet accurately) model the expected behavior
of larger populations.
Next, we focus on hotspot locations. In Fig. 5.3(a), we present the heat map of most
visited locations in the Gangnam and Seocho districts from the data set (ground truth).
The most visited areas are in the northern part of Gangnam and across the border between
the two districts. These hotspots correspond to the density of commercial buildings in
these areas, which results in higher tra c areas. Fig. 5.3(b) and (c) show the heat map of
visits in the first week for simulated populations of 10, 000 and 20, 000, accordingly. From
both simulations, we observe similar hotspots, consistent with the ground truth heat map.
This similarity further validates the accuracy of the simulation.
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(a) Comparison of mitigation measures (b) Validation of mitigation measures
Figure 5.4: E↵ect of di↵erent counter-measures. Results are presented with 95% confi-
dence intervals (shaded areas).
5.2 Applying mitigation measures
We now turn to the evaluation of the e↵ectiveness of counter-measures. We first consider
stay-at-home advisory that allows for only essential activity outside of the agent’s domicile.
On average, agents stay home for longer periods time under the advisory, but are are
permitted to leave periodically. The probability of leaving home is set to 20% of the
agent’s mobility. This can be tuned to simulate a stricter (or more relaxed) stay-at-home
advisory. Once the agent arrives at the destination building, the probability of leaving
the building is defined by the mobility without any additional scaling (i.e., the time spent
outside the domicile is not a↵ected).
In addition to this counter-measure, we also consider strict district border control
between the Gangnam and Seocho districts, i.e., forbid movements between these two
areas entirely. With a strict border control between these two districts, agents can only
stay in their home district: the probability of leaving their home district is set to 0.
We simulate these two mitigation measures under population 10, 000, see Fig. 5.4(a) for
results. First, the application of a stay-at-home advisory decreases the rate of virus spread
in comparison to the baseline scenario where no counter-measures are applied. The strict
border control o↵ers a mild mitigation measure comparing to the baseline scenario.
As further validation, we simulate the e↵ects of applying a stay-at-home advisory mid-
simulation in order to capture the e↵ects of the mitigation measures taken in Seoul on
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March 22 – the Strong Social Distancing Campaign. Figure 5.4(b) depicts the results of
these simulations against the ground truth. In this simulation case, we begin with no
mitigation measures and apply a stay-at-home advisory once we reach a certain threshold
number of infections. Here we select this threshold based on the number of infections in
the ground truth data when the Strong Social Distancing campaign was enacted, however,
this threshold is a parameter and we can choose to transition between no measures and a
stay-at-home advisory at any given number of infections. This further highlights the ability




The proposed model captures the spread of COVID-19 in an urban setting. Although
the model is validated using ground truth, incomplete and/or missing data may limit its
generalization and make it far from being the definitive COVID-19 spreading model. Main
limitations of our approach include:
First wave data. This data is from the first wave in the disease in South Korea. With
South Korea having one of the best responses to the disease globally, the mobility patterns
reflect inevitably cultural and demographic characteristics as well as policy decisions.
Scarcity of data. We continue to seek additional data sets on COVID-19 outbreaks.
The current lack of substantial data is an unfortunate limitation. For example, the data
on super-spreader mobility are not of statistical significance, there is no exact information
on the elapsed time in each location by each agent but only the sequence of locations, we
do not have exact information on the movements inside buildings. In addition, the data
on patient mobility was removed from Kaggle on May 31, 2020. While we did analyze the
mobility data, we can make available to the community all information presented in this
thesis in the form of histograms and CDFs (not in their raw form, the appendix presents
how such data can be retrieved).
Privacy concerns. The KCDC data set is anonymized and no sensitive data of monitored
patients can be retrieved. No data about the underage population is provided as well as
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movements of patients from/to their private homes. This limits the scenarios that can be
analyzed, e.g., the impact of school closures or the spreading of the virus within households.
Note also that the per-patient mobility information (and its statistics) were retrieved from
the PatientRoute data set while it was available to the public. Since June 2020, this data
set became unavailable. We have no way to evaluate how the mobility statistics changed
during the second wave in Fall 2020.
Transportation assumptions. The KCDC data set does not show the transportation
mode of patients. We overcome this limitation by assuming a pedestrian:vehicles ratio of
1:1, this ratio can be adjusted as needed. Input parameters can be fully customized and




The COVID-19 pandemic has been studied extensively in recent months due to its dis-
ruptive e↵ects. Di↵erent approaches have been adopted to increase our knowledge on the
pandemic. Pung et al. [32] interview COVID-19 patients in Singapore to collect epidemi-
ological/clinical data to study the spread of the virus in three di↵erent Singapore clusters,
this approach by its nature can be applied to populations of a small scale only. Epidemi-
ological models allow studying how an infection spread on a larger scale and are classified
as mathematical or agent-based.
Mathematical models are defined by a set of equations that allow describing the
evolution of the disease [30]. Bi et al. [9] use conditional logistic regression to study the
transmission of COVID-19 in Shenzhen, China. Using data from contact-based surveil-
lance and accurate infector-infectee relationships, they confirm that, on average, COVID-
19 has an incubation period of less than a week and a long clinical course. Rader et al. [33]
use regression models to evaluate how the socio-economic and environmental aspects of
a region a↵ect the spreading of COVID-19. Garg et al. [18] predict hospitalization rates
from clinical data (e.g., age, ethnicity, medical conditions, clinical course) of COVID-19
patients in 14 states of the USA. Note that the above works do not focus on the SARS-
CoV-2 spread in a community.
Pejó and Biczók [31] use game theory to evaluate the e ciency of face masks and social
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distancing in limiting the spread of COVID-19 when there are selfish patients who do not
use any counter-measures. Similarly, Bhattacharyya and Bauch [8] use game theory to
evaluate the e ciency of protective vaccines (the safest way to achieve herd immunity
[15]).
Grossmann et al. [20] propose a stochastic network-based to model COVID-19 spread,
and compare its results with those obtained through an ordinary di↵erential equations
(ODE) model. Their network-based model leverages random graph models to represent
interaction structures and human connections. They observe that ODE models struggle
to correctly represent heterogeneity of interaction structures, a feature that profoundly
a↵ects the spread of the virus. While this work does focus on human interactions, it does
not explicitly model spatial population movements.
Agent-based models (ABMs) are a simulation-based alternative of mathematical
models that incorporate human interactions [24]. ABMs are typically used for modeling
pedestrian movements, resource usage, and to successfully study the spread of diseases [14,
21, 36].
Ferguson et al. [16] model the spread of influenza in British and American households,
schools, and workplaces. Their simulations are parameterized using census and land use
data as well as air travel patterns. Note that the above work considers only large scale
(international) population movements. ABMs parameterized by census data have been
used to capture the spread of COVID-19 in Australia [34, 13]. Using census and age-
distribution data from Germany and Poland, Bock et al. [10] investigate the e ciency of
mitigation strategies by accounting for interactions within households where it is hard to
social distance. Census ABM-based frameworks have been used to simulate the COVID-
19 outbreak [22], evaluate the e ciency of contact tracing [7], face masks [23], and testing
strategies [37]. Kim et al. [27] use synthetic, location-based social network data to study
outbreaks and evaluate the e↵ectiveness of di↵erent mitigation strategies, especially how
social behaviors a↵ect the virus spread. ABMs are used also to model the spread of SARS-
CoV-2 in small areas: crowded areas of supermarkets [40] and university campuses [19].
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Di↵erently from our approach, no fine-grained movement data is used in any of the above
works. The above models are parameterized using census or synthetic data while population
movement habits are captured at a coarse granularity.
Müller et al. [29] use an ABM parameterized with synthetic mobility traces (originally
generated from mobile phone data for public transportation applications) to study the
COVID-19 outbreak in Berlin and analyze how mitigation measures result in reduction
of activity in public. [29] is the closest to our work but it does not provide any detailed
statistics on agent mobility during the pandemic as we do here.
Summarizing, in this thesis we extract human movement habits and dynamics from
the KCDC data set of real COVID-19 patients. The mobility information (i.e., patient
mobility, traveled distance, visited locations) and statistics are used to tune an ABM and
investigate the COVID-19 outbreak in two districts of Seoul. Agent movements and be-
haviors are simulated using the statistics of actual human movements, other structures
(e.g., networks or graphs) are not required. The proposed approach allows investigating
scenarios under di↵erent circumstances to identifying mitigation strategies.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Ongoing Work
Information and routes of South Korean COVID-19 patients are analyzed to study the
disease outbreak in the Gangnam and Seocho districts of Seoul. Movement habits in
South Korea are extracted from available data sets to parameterize simulations, based on
ABM and GIS, and study interactions among people. Simulation results are in excellent
agreement with ground truth and show that this model can be used to flexibly examine and
evaluate a wide variety of di↵erent scenarios based on di↵erent human mobility patterns
from real-world data. While we do not claim that it is a definitive COVID-19 spread
model, it can be used to investigate useful what-if scenarios.
We are currently working on expanding the simulation model to create a prediction
ecosystem for evaluating detailed scenarios: geographical restrictions of mobility, work
from home orders/advisories, school closures (and partial openings under di↵erent condi-
tions), points of interest operating under various capacities, time in quarantine, and vacci-
nation priority. We propose to enrich the existing data that currently drive the model via
cross-fertilization of datasets: correlate the sojourn at points-of-interest from Safegraph
with Google mobility data in the U.S. as done in [12] to provide informative guesses for
sojourn times in Seoul (note that Google mobility data exist for Seoul but there are no
Safegraph data). We will also compare the Seoul KCDC mobility with stochastic mobility
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models of Berlin [29]1 to identify similarities and di↵erences among population mobility
in two urban settings. Focusing on the KCDC data set again, we will use hypergraphs to
identify “patient bubbles” that frequent within the same points-of-interest, explore di↵er-
ent ways to create “bubbles,” and how these “bubbles” evolve across time. Our study of
the KCDC logs is an example of data that are incomplete, a common problem in tracing
datasets. We will use the ABM model to “generate” mobility data for larger populations
(note that the KCDC trace logs are for a relative small set as South Korea successfully
dealt with the disease early on). The generated mobility logs will create a “ground truth”.
We will then introduce “gaps” in this set of logs, use machine learning to fill them [39]
and explore whether we can use this mechanism to enrich missing data in the KCDC logs.
1The Berlin logs are not publicly available, but stochastic models of mobility are.
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